ituac 8 riJc I/XT/C' That, from whence the principle of motion is, is one cause, and the matter is another.—Where Aristotle gives that name of cause to the matter also, though others did appropriate it to the active power. And the writer De Pla-citis Philosophorum* expresses this as the general sense of the ancients: aSvvarov *apxnv'piav* vXr?v rwv

0i/Tft>v s£ iJc TCI Travra v7roaT7?vai, aXXa /ecu TO TTOIOVV **curtov** *j* VTTortOlvcu, olov ov/c *-apyvpog dpKtiirpoc;* TO f/c?rwjua Y[£]~ *av* jut) /cat TO TTOIOVV r?, TOVT£(TTtv o *apyvpoKOiroQ) ical* ITT! TOV ^aX^cov, *ical rov* ^w,Xov, ifai T?/C «XX??c

It is impossble$_r$ that matter alone should be the sole principle of all things, tut there must of necessity be supposed also an agent or efficient cause: as silver alone is not sufficient to make a cup, unless there be an artificer to work upon it. And the same is to be said concerning brass, wood, and other natural bodies.—

Now as they apprehended a necessity of these two principles, so they conceived them to be such, as could not be confounded together into one and the same thing or substance, they having such distinct ideas and essential characters from one another; the Stoics being the only persons, who, offering violence to their own apprehensions, rudely and unskilfully attempted to make these two distinct things to be one and the, same sub-stance; Wherefore, as the first of these, vis. matter, or passive extended bulk, is taken by all* for substance, and commonly called by the name of body; so the other, which is far the more noble of the two, being that, which acts upon the matter, and hath a commanding power over it, must needs be,substance too, of a different kind frort*

* Lib. i. cf»p. iii, p. 876, torn. i. opcr. Elutarchi.